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Case No. 20208 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants' argument that the purpose of Utah's Married 
Womens's Act was to "place a husband and wife on equal footing" 
presumes that the critical ambiguous language of Utah's Married 
Women's Act should be interpreted in the way that it has been 
interpreted. Plaintiff asserts that the language at issue simply 
clears up the questions then existing concerning whether the 
husband could bring an action on behalf of his wife or whether he 
could or had to join in an action brought by the wife. The language 
was not intended to remove any separate rights which the husband had 
for his own injuries under common law, and even if "complete" 
equalization were a purpose of the Married Women's Act, a recogni-
tion of the consortium claims of both spouses would accomplish that 
task in addition to its clear primary purpose of removing all the 
common law disabilities from married women. 
Defendants' argument that no problem with Article I 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution exists is based upon court 
decisions of the 1960's and 1970fs which were based upon the very 
legislation in question rather than the state of the law prior to 
1898. Both the statutory construction and Married Women's legisla-
tion would have to comply with the appropriate constitutional provi-
sions , and resolution of some of the Constitutional questions 
requires inquiry into the situation existing in 1898 and before. 
Unquestionably, consortium was an integral part of the 
pre-1898 common law. Even where emancipation acts had been enacted, 
the overwhelming majority of United States court decisions continued 
to recognize and have continued to recognize the husband's consor-
tium interest. Even the wife's consortium interest had been recog-
nized at that time in the intentional tort context. Nothing 
indicates that a Utah court would have decided prior to 1898 to 
disavow the common law as it then existed in this country. In fact, 
the decisions relied upon by defendants recognize that in Utah prior 
to 1898, a husband's right to consortium existed. 
Whatever the common law origins of consortium, the 
consortium interest is now recognized as a real interest deserving 
judicial support. It is no longer viewed as a relic. The basic 
purpose of our tort system of allowing people to be compensated for 
their injuries far outweighs the various objections to consortium 
which defendants have asserted. 
With respect to equal protection concerns, it is not 
enough, even under the rational basis test, to point out distinc-
tions between categories. The distinctions have to be real and 
rationally related to some valid governmental objective. Under our 
State Constitution, elimination of a common law claim for such 
reasons as defendants have advocated, is not such an objective. 
With sex classification, much more stringent standards 
apply. Although equality results by denying rights to both spouses, 
0&£*r the relevant language of the Married Women's Act, if it is to 
continue to be interpreted as it has been, applies only to the 
husband, and equality results only by eliminating male rights not 
related to the emancipation ojective. Under such an interpretation, 
the Act is directed at one sex on its face. Since equality can be 
achieved without taking away a husband's claim by recognizing simi-
lar rights for the wife, the discriminatory language does not sur-
vive the stricter test applied to sex-based discrimination. 
I. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION DOES NOT REQUIRE ABOLITION OF 
CONSORTIUM AND WOULD SUPPORT RECOGNITION OF SUCH 
CLAIMS 
The purpose of the Married Women's Acts was to free women 
from their common law disabilities, 41 Am. Jr. 2d "Husband and 
Wife", Section 17. As the period of time which passed between 
passage of the Married Women's Acts and the recognition of their 
right to maintain a consortium illustrates, there was no expressed 
intent to "equalize" all aspects of the male-female relationship, 
although much intended equalization occurred with emancipation. 
A. Granting the Wife the Right to Claim Loss of 
Consortium also Results in Equalization. 
Any "complete equalizing" intent is as adequately 
accomplished by bringing both spouses up to the same level as by 
reducing one spouse's rights. Indeed, numerous courts have answered 
the contention that no action for a wife's loss of consortium existed 
at common law by asserting that however demeaning the wife's 
position was at ancient common law, by the time the Married Women's 
Acts began to be enacted, the woman's condition had improved to the 
point that she had a recognized interest in the "marriage relation-
ship" as evidenced by the recognition of her right to maintain an 
action for intentional alienation. See the discussion in Hoekstra 
v. Helgeland, 98 N.W. 2d 669 (S.D., 1959). In addition, other 
inroads into the disabilities of the medieval common law had been 
accomplished by statute. As a result, the view has been stated that 
during the relevant time period just before and around the time that 
Married Women's Acts were being enacted, the wife had the lawful 
right to the consortium of the husband, but simply could not main-
tain a claim while the relationship existed because of those disabi-
lities of coverture which still remained. Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 
N.W.2d 669, 673-679, 681-682 (S.D., 1959); Brown v. Georgia-
Tennessee Coaches, 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1953); 
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 816 (D.C. App., 1950); see 
also Hoffman v. Dautel, 388 P.2d 615, 619 (Kan., 1964) where the 
analysis is succinctly articulated but not agreed to by that court. 
The particularly strong constitutional protection provided 
by Article 1 Section 24 and Article 4 Section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution makes the analysis not followed by the Kansas court 
but approved by the others, especially appropriate to Utah. 
In this respect, Utah's equal rights provision contained 
in Article 4 Section 1, deserves special mention. The only Utah 
cases that plaintiff is aware of dealing with this section, relate to 
voting. But voting and the right to hold office are guaranteed by 
the first sentence of Article 4 Section 1, and the second sentence 
goes on to more broadly guaranty rights by stating that both sexes 
shall "enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and 
privileges." (emphasis added). The application of this Constitu-
tional provision should be interpreted by the words it uses and not 
just the captions around it, and the most plausible reading of the 
second sentence of Article 4 Section 1 would include in its results 
married women having the right to maintain an action for loss of 
consortium the day our Utah Constitution came into effect since 
married men had the same right under common law. 
B. The Married Women's Act Was Never Intended to Achieve 
Equality by Denying Consortium Rights. 
To argue that the Married Women's Act was designed to 
put husbands and wives on a "completely equal" basis, ignores the 
interpretation issue. 
Equalizing and emancipating, (or in Utah's case, more 
fully emancipating as far as legislation is concerned) , are relcited 
* 
The territorial legislature had enacted some incomplete laws 
covering domestic relations. Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888, 
Section 2529, provided that "either spouse may sue or be sued" but 
did not address the joinder question then existing, at least in 
community property states, on personal injury claims and could 
well be interpreted of giving the right to sue to either or both 
spouses. Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888 Section 2528 provided that 
property acquired by either spouse before marriage and certain 
property , not including personal injury claims, acquired after 
the marriage relationship was property of that spouse and could be 
dealt with as separate property during the marriage or otherwise. 
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legislature was only considering those damage elements that would 
give the wife full compensation for her own injuries. As is dis-
cussed in plaintiff's original brief and later herein, the elements 
which comprise the consortium claim are totally different from 
anything that the physically injured wife, suing for her own 
injuries, would be compensated for. Millington v. Southeastern 
Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 239 N.E.2d 897, 899, 
36 A.L.R.3d 891, 893 (1968). 
The statutory wording needs to be examined in light of 
conditions existing at the time the statutes were enacted. Under 
the common law, a husband had to file a claim for the wife's 
injuries, and it was the law in other jurisdictions around the turn 
of the century that had not enacted the comprehensive Married 
Women's Acts that we see today that the husband could maintain his 
own actions to recover medical expenses and loss of earning capacity 
when the wife was injured, e.g., Robinson v. Metropolitan St. Ry. 
Co., 69 N.Y.S. 891, 34 Misc. 795 (1901); see also Standen v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co., 63 A.467 (Pa., 1906). In some community property 
states, at least, the wife had to be joined by her husband, unless 
they were separated, e.g. Matthew v. Central Pacific Railroad Co.f 
63 Cal. 450 (1883); Lindsay v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 90 
P.984 (Idaho, 1907). The pre-1898 Utah territorial statutes did not 
settle questions such as these either. Plaintiff asserts that the 
particular wording of Utah's Married Women's Act was intended simply 
to make it clear that not only could the wife sue for her own 
injuries, but that she alone could bring that suit. 
Complete equality as opposed to complete removal of common 
law disabilities was not the purpose of our Married Women's Act. 
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ceivable that prior to 1898, the highest Utah court would not have 
recognized a consortium claim had the issue been presented. In 
fact, the existance of a husband's claim would not even have been 
questioned. Under these circumstances, it would not take a 
declaration of Utah's highest court to let us know what the common 
law was. Further, it is inconsistent to argue that the legislature 
intended to eliminate the consortium right and to also maintain that 
no such right existed. 
Although plaintiff disputes the statutory interpretation 
of the Married Women's Act assumed in Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 
143, 493 P.2d 986 (1972), by asserting that the women had no right 
to consortium at common law and that the ambiguous wording of the 
Married Woman's Act at issue here "placed husband and wife on an 
equal basis", this Court recognized that prior to the effective date 
of the 1898 Acts, a husband had the right to maintain a loss of 
consortium claim. Judge Christensen also recognized the obvious in 
Black v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 470 (D. Utah, 1967) when he 
stated that the interpretation of Utah's Married Women's Act which 
plaintiff asserts is the most logical and only Constitutionally 
permissible construction would result in a "resuscitation of the 
common law rule". :id. at 480. It is only the interpretation of the 
Married Women's Act that has caused consortium not to have been 
recognized in Utah at the appellate level, and this Court and the 
U.S. District Court clearly realized that a husband's pre-1898 
rights included consortium. 
One of the points of plaintiff's original brief was 
that the Injury Redress provision found in Article I Section 11 of 
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rights were taken away by statute. If the husband's rights cannot 
be taken away, the expressed reason for denying those same rights to 
the wife disappears. 
III. THE REASONS ADVANCED FOR THE CONTINUATION FOR UTAH'S 
POLICY ARE NOT PERSUASIVE. 
A. The Public Policy of Compensating the Injured for 
Their Damages Would be Furthered by Recognition 
of this Tort. 
Defendant Utah Power & Light lists reasons which have been 
advanced from time to time against consortium claims generally. The 
short answer to this litany is that it has been rejected with vir-
tual unanimity by the states, and for good reason. There is no 
indication that meaningful difficulties have been encountered in 
these states in affecting settlements or judicial resolutions 
because of consortium claims. 
Virtually all of the concerns voiced by defendants simply 
require the court to make a decision. In most of the cases, the 
particular way that the court eventually chooses to resolve a legal 
question will not have any impact beyond actual litigants who do not 
follow the court's decision on how such questions are to be 
resolved. 
In answer to defendants' concern that there is no 
stopping point for awarding compensation for injuries to a relation-
ship once a court decides to allow consortium claims, not only is 
the marriage relationship clearly distinguishable historically, 
sociologically and legally from all the others cited by defendants, 
but it is simply not wise decisional policy for a court to fail to 
make the right decision on a case before it based upon allegations 
that it will not be able to control itself when faced with different 
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ship, affection, society, sexual relations, and solace are certainly 
deserving of compensation. The Court stated: 
Disparagingly described as 'sentimental1 or 
'parasitic' damages, the mental and emotional 
anguish caused by seeing a healthy loving companion-
able mate turned into a shell of a person is real 
enough. To describe the loss as 'indirect' is 
only to evade the issue. The loss of 
companionship, emotional support, love, felicity 
and sexual relations are real injuries. The 
trauma of having to care for a permanent invalid 
is known to have caused mental illness...Even 
in the case of a husband the 'sentimental' damages 
may predominate over the loss of support or 
material element. Thus to describe these damages 
as merely parasitic is inaccurate and cruel... 
It is also contended that the 'sentimental' 
damages such as the diminution of the value of her 
husband's society and affection and the 
deprivation of sexual relationship and the 
attendant loss of child-bearing opportunity are 
too personal, intangible, and conjectural to be 
measured in pecuniary terms by a jury. The 
argument has no merit. The logic of it would also 
hold a jury incompetent to award damages for pain 
and suffering. 
Money is a poor substitute for the loss of a child 
or the pain resulting from serious injuries. 
Likewise, it cannot truly compensate a wife for 
the destruction of her marrige, but it is the only 
known means to compensate for the loss suffered 
and to symbolize society's recognition that a 
culpable wrong - even if unintentionl - has been 
done. (239 N.E.2d 897, 899, 902) 
Whatever its ancient origins, "consortium now represents 
the interest of the injured party's spouse in the continuance of a 
healthy and happy marital life." Millington v. Southeastern Eleva-
tor Co., 239 N.E.2d 897, 900. Once this is recognized, "it 
becomes evident that the cause of action is not a relic." Id. 
B. There is No Double Recovery in the Consortium Tort, 
and There is No Recovery for the Consortium Elements 
Through the Primary Case. 
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husbanu ni his action for the impairment of his 
ability to support... Since the possibility of 
double recovery can be eliminated by the simple 
adjustment of damages, it should not constitute 
a basis for denying [the wife's] action, which 
includes many elements which are in no way com-
pensable in the husband's action. Millington v. 
Southeastern Elevator Co., supra, 239 N.E.2d 
897, 899, 36 A.L.R.3d 891, 893 (1968). (Emphasis 
was added in the Millington case but was not in 
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C. The Remaining Rationale of Black v. United States 
is Not Persuasive, 
Defendants rely heavily on Judge Christensen's considered 
opinion in Black v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 470 (D. Ut., 1967). 
Placed in the difficult position of having to guess what Utah's law 
might be, and not having been presented with all the issues that are 
involved, Judge Christensen took an understandably conservative 
approach. His concerns about double damages and unlimited recogni-
tion of other types of claims in different types of relationships 
have been discussed, as has the ambiguity present in Utah's Married 
Women's Act. 
Judge Christensen recognized the ambiguity present in 
Utah's Married Women's Act. Admittedly, he resolved that ambiguity 
against consortium, but his uncertainies were such that he had to 
rely upon such things as his experience to resolve it. Before 
formerly recognized consortium rights are abolished, the intent to 
do so should be clear. Omaha and Republican Valley Railroad Com-
pany v. Chollette, 59 N.W. 921, 925 (Neb. 1894). At the very least, 
our statute is not clear. 
However appropriate it may have been for a Federal 
District Judge finding himself in his position to rely upon 
personal experience, the number of reported consortium claims 
raised in both the Federal District Court and this Court actually 
reported and cited by defendants demonstrate the weakness of the 
rationale. Moreover, this court is in the position of making such 
determinations without the need to depend on informal perceptions of 
Uta s position h^</* i •-r., * JI i *-- M • * i fferent 
position. 
I). Defendant Utah Power & Light's Suggested Alternative 
is Obviously Inappropriate and Inadequate. 
Utah Power & I ,i ghtl s suggested alternative to consortium. 
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States Constitution, place restrictions on governmental exercise 
of authority in passing legislation. 
In the case of Malan v. Lewis, No. 17606 (Utah, May 1, 
1984) the Utah Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, stated con-
cerning these restrictions: 
Basic principles of equal protection of the law 
are inherent in the very concept of juctice and 
are a necessary attribute of a just society. Id. 
at 12. 
A. Under the Rational Basis Test, Classifications 
Must be "Real" and Rationally Related to Legitimate 
Government Objectives. 
1. The distinctions between classifications cannot be fanciful. 
It is difficult to imagine any thing or category that 
cannot be distinguished in some way from another thing or category. 
As a result, to be valid, classifications must be based on "real 
distinctions" and not on artificial or irrelevant ones. Malan v. 
Lewis, No. 17606 (Utah, May 1, 1984). 
Defendants' argument that a valid distinction can be found 
between intentional alienation of affections, and consortium reveals 
a distinction without a legally meaningful difference. The mere fact 
that only one person suffers a legal injury in the intentional tort 
case, while both suffer in a negligent tort case is merely a des-
criptive distinction devoid of legal significance. Indeed, as the 
state of the law in the United States reveals, of the two torts, the 
consortium tort is clearly the most relevant to today's society, and 
it is consortium rather than intentional alienation of the 
affections that is recognized as the more meaningful by today's 
legal community. 
2. Elimination of the consortium tort does not serve any legitimate 
state purpose. 
To pass equal protection muster, classifications must be 
rationally related to a "legitimate articulated state purpose." 
McGinnis, Commissioner of Correction et. al. v. Royster, 410 U.S. 
263, 270, 35 L.Ed.2d 282, 288, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 1059 (1973). 
With respect to the wrongful death situation, plaintiff 
concedes the need to fully and adequately compensate heirs who 
suffer as a result of a wrongful death, especially in light of 
Utah's Constitutional wrongful death command. As a result, plain-
tiff does not argue that the distinction between wrongful death and 
consortium is anything but real. What plaintiff does argue is that 
both in comparison to wrongful death situations and in the aliena-
tion of affections situation, no legitimate governmental purpose 
is served by treating the negligent loss of consortium any 
differently in the two kinds of cases. 
As has been discussed, the purpose of the Married Women's 
Act was to legislatively remove common law disabilities and the 
purpose of the Wrongful Death Act is to compensate heirs. Neither 
of these purposes is furthered by denying the consortium claim to a 
spouse who must deal with a severely injured but living companion. 
In addition, given the protection embodied in Article I, 
Section 11, and given the fact that "complete" equality, (even if 
that were a purpose of the Married Women's Act), could be achieved 
without destroying the husband's common law consortium claim by 
recognizing it in the wife, something more stringent than a showing 
of any conceivable rational basis ought to be required. To be sure, 
common law tort rights are not fundamental rights under U.S. Consti-
tutional law, but under Utah's Constitution, a greater showing of 
need than what has been shown should be required under an equal 
protection concept, regardless of the way in which the legal ques-
tions might be resolved under Article 1 section 11 itself. 
B. As Presently Interpreted, Section 30-2-4 is an 
Invidious Attack Based on Sex. 
By its express terms, if interpreted as it has been, 
Section 30-2-4 is directed at the husband because of his sex. Sex 
classification is subject to scrutiny under equal protection 
clauses. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75,30 L. Ed.2d 225, 92 S.Ct. 
251 (1971). The fact that the classification discriminates against 
men rather than women does not protect it from scrutiny. Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 50 L. Ed.2d 397, 97 S.Ct. 451 (1976). To 
withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, classifica-
tions by gender must serve important governmental objectives and 
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. 
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-317, 51 L. Ed.2d 360, 97 S. 
Ct. 1192 (1977). 
When a strict scrutiny test is applicable, the proponent 
of the statute must show that the purpose of the statute is "con-
stitutionally permissible and substantial" and that the classifi-
cation is "necessary...to the accomplishment of its purpose." 
In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722, 37 L.Ed.2d 910, 915, 93a. S.Ct. 
2851, 2855 (1973). If there are alternative means available which 
achieve a legislation's goals without the intrusion or discrimina-
tion complained of, the state must choose the "less drastic means." 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274, 284-85, 
92 S.Ct. 995, 1003-04 (1972); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 163 
(Alaska, 1977) reversed on other grounds 437 U.S. 518, 57 L.Ed. 2d 
397, 98 S.Ct. 2482 (1978). 
Certainly emancipating women from common law disabilities 
meets these tests. But achieving "completeM equality (even if that 
were the purpose) by the removal of common law rights of the other 
sex, when' it is not necessary to take away rights to achieve that 
equality, could not possibly withstand "scrutiny" or "strict 
scrutiny." The alternative of recognizing the right in the other 
spouse to achieve equality being available, accepted, and in strict 
conformity with recognized public policy, the taking away of a 
husband's right just so that equality will be achieved at a lower 
level cannot withstand the strict test which exists for sex-based 
discrimination. 
The result obtained by following the present interpreta-
tion of Section 30-2-4 is not even like the constitutionally-
questionable affirmative action programs where some taking from one 
group is necessary to help a group that society has discriminated 
against. In the consortium area, taking is not necessary to achieve 
equality. The mere fact that equality is reached does not mean that 
equal protection concerns are satisfied as the dispute over the 
constitutionality of affirmative action illustrates. Discrimina-
tion cannot be allowed when equality can be achieved without it. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is aware of the arguments raised in opposition 
in consortium claims in general and to Utah consortium claims in 
particular. Plaintiff asserts, however, that none of those reasons 
are compelling and that they should not be used to keep damages to 
the marital relationship suffered in Utah uncompensable. Moreover, 
following the continued interpretation of Utah's Married Women's 
Act places that Act in conflict with fundamental Constitutional 
protections. 
DATED thi _^  . ^ 
HENRfKSEN & HENRIKSEN, P.C. 
tis / ^ day of ' thiO^. , 1985, 
APPENDICES 
23 
Appendix A 
Cited Utah State Constitutional Provisions 
I, Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel any civil cause to which he is a 
party. 
II. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
III. Utah Constitution, Article IV, Section 1 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and 
hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. 
Both male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally 
all civil, political and religious rights and privileges. 
IV. Utah Constitution, Article XVI, Section 5 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries 
resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount 
recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation, 
except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in 
death is provided for by law. 
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appendix B 
Cited Provisions of the Constitution 
of the United States of America 
Amendment XIV, Seciton 1 of the United States Constitution 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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Appendix C 
Cited Utah Statutory Provisions 
I. Utah Code Ann. Section 30-2-4 (1976) 
A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor, 
maintain an action therefor in her own name and hold the same in 
her own right, and may prosecute and defend all actions for the 
preservation and protection of her rights and property as if 
unmarried. There shall be no right of recovery by the husband on 
account of personal injury or wrong to his wifef or for expenses 
connected therewithf but the wife may recover against a third 
person for such injury or wrong as if unmarriedf and such 
recovery shall include expenses of medical treatment and other 
expenses paid or assumed by the husband. 
II. Utah Code Ann. Section 68-3-2 (1978) 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation 
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the 
statutes of this state. The statutes establish the laws of this 
state respecting the subjects to which they relatef and their 
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and 
to promote justice. Whenever there is any variance between the 
rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the 
same matter the rules of equity shall prevail. 
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Appendix D 
Cited Provisions from the Compiled 
Laws of Utah, 1888 
I. Section 2528 of the Complied Laws of Utah, 1888 
All property owned by either spouse before marriage, 
and that acquired afterwards by purchase, gift, bequest, devise 
or descent, with the rents, issues and profits thereof, is the 
separate property of that spouse by whom the same is so owned or 
acquired, and separate property owned or acquired as specified 
above, may be held, managed, controlled, transferred and in any 
manner disposed of by the spouse so owning or acquiring it, 
without any limitation or restriction by reason of marriage. 
II. Section 2529 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888 
Either spouse may sue or be sued, plead and be 
impleaded, or defend and be defended at law. 
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